BENEATH THE SURFACE I Megaprojects Often Become a Mega-Mess To put this into international n keeping with the Megaprojects theme of this issue of Deep Foundations, I offer my take on the subject. This may not be as positive as one would hope. While we are all familiar with some of the most famous or “infamous” megaprojects, we may not have a full grasp of how these potential marvels may not be all they were cracked up to be. What is a Megaproject? Wikipedia defines a megaproject as “one with a price tag of at least $1 billion.” I think that $1 billion doesn’t even begin to touch it when it comes to many of the most visible and notor- ious projects. According to Wikipedia, other characteristics of mega- projects are that they attract lots of public attention due in large part to the substantial impacts on communities, the envi- ronment and budgets. Projects can also be “initiatives” that are phy- sical, very expensive and public. These kinds of projects include tunnels, bridges, dams, highways, airports, hospitals, sky- scrapers, cruise ships, wind farms, offshore oil and gas rigs, aluminum smelters, nuclear power plants, aerospace missions, particle accelerators, canals and sports stadiums. Megaprojects are not restricted to the civil engineering and civil construction universe. However, for purposes of this diatribe I will stick to those related to construction. In this regard, I think that in order to fully qualify as a megaproject, the undertaking must involve the participation of a number of public and private entities, be characterized by the need to coordinate a large number of contractor-providers, and have a fairly long lead time for completion. “I suggest that when proposing this kind of project, those involved should not be overly optimistic. Perhaps a modicum of pessimism is called for as one develops a realistic assessment of how these kinds of projects will unfold.” perspective, I turn to an article by management guru Bent Flyvberg, a professor at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School. In the article that appeared in the April 11, 2015 issue of The New Yorker, Flyvberg noted that megaprojects have come to constitute 8% of global domestic product. That’s a pretty stout number. Not sur- prisingly, this rush to Megaville has been led by China. In an earlier article by Flyvberg, published in 2014 in the Project Management Journal, he offered (perhaps whim- sically), that megaprojects are always “over budget, over time, and over-and- over.” He called this phe- nomenon the “survival of the unfitest.” He also noted that the least deserving projects often get built precisely because their cost-benefit estimates are so misleadingly opti- mistic. I don’t mean to be overly cynical here, but there are multiple in- stances in which those planning and/or attemp- ting to fund these massive projects knowingly and publically understate the true anticipated costs. This has been known to be the case in a number of high-visibility state and local projects. One of the most widely criticized is a massive transit project that was proposed in San Francisco a few years ago. In this case, it has been alleged that the civil planners knew all along that the estimate they were presenting for public funding was well below what they knew the project would ultimately cost. Experience shows us that there doesn’t even have to be any collusive element in these kinds of occur- AUTHOR S. Scot Litke, Hon. D.GE rences. They are, as Flyvberg suggests, a fact of life. Perhaps this often becomes a question of being too big to succeed without a significant amount of trouble. I suggest that when proposing this kind of project, those involved should not be overly optimistic. Perhaps a modicum of pessimism is called for as one develops a realistic assessment of how these kinds of projects will unfold. Well Documented Examples We are all familiar with the Boston Artery, or “Big Dig” project. Most likely many of you had direct “experience” with this one. I recall that initial cost estimates were in the $8 billion range. I also remember how $8 became $10, which became $13 and so on. I doubt that anyone can put an exact figure on how this all shook out. The endgame ultimately included, but was not limited to claims, counterclaims, repairs, redos and a panoply of aggravated (aggravating) factors. Unfortunately, this is the standard fare of how these kinds of undertakings often evolve. I vividly recall conversations that, based on the Boston experience, some doubted that there would ever be another megaproject of this type. Well, that didn’t turn out to be the case. One need only look to what is going on with the now infamous Alaska Viaduct Replacement project, an aging elevated roadway that skirts downtown Seattle, Wash. Much has been written about this up-and-down tunneling project and the problems associated with the tunnel boring machine (TBM), so I won’t belabor the point. What this project will ultimately cost, who will wind up paying for it and when it will be completed is anybody’s guess. DEEP FOUNDATIONS • NOV/DEC 2016 • 119
